Abstract. We extend the fully homomorphic encryption scheme over the integers of van Dijk et al. (DGHV) to batch fully homomorphic encryption, i.e. to a scheme that supports encrypting and homomorphically processing a vector of plaintext bits as a single ciphertext. Our variant remains semantically secure under the (error-free) approximate-GCD problem. We also show how to perform arbitrary permutations on the underlying plaintext vector given the ciphertext and the public key. Our scheme offers competitive performance: we describe an implementation of the fully homomorphic evaluation of AES encryption, with an amortized cost of about 12 minutes per AES ciphertext on a standard desktop computer; this is comparable to the timings presented by Gentry et al. at Crypto 2012 for their implementation of a Ring-LWE based fully homomorphic encryption scheme.
Introduction
Fully Homomorphic Encryption. Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) allows a worker to perform implicit additions and multiplications on plaintext values while exclusively manipulating encrypted data. The first construction of a fully homomorphic scheme (based on ideal lattices) was described by Gentry in [Gen09] , and proceeds in several steps. First, one constructs a somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme, which only supports a limited number of multiplications: ciphertexts contain some noise that becomes larger with successive homomorphic multiplications, and only ciphertexts whose noise size remains below a certain threshold can be decrypted correctly. The second step is to squash the decryption procedure associated with an arbitrary ciphertext so that it can be expressed as a low degree polynomial in the secret key bits. Then, Gentry's key idea, called bootstrapping, consists in homomorphically evaluating this decryption polynomial on encryptions of the secret key bits, resulting in a different ciphertext associated with the same plaintext, but with possibly reduced noise. This refreshed ciphertext can then be used in subsequent homomorphic operations. By repeatedly refreshing ciphertexts, the number of homomorphic operations becomes unlimited, resulting in a fully homomorphic encryption scheme.
Since Gentry's breakthrough result, many improvements have been made, introducing new variants, improving efficiency, and providing new features. Recently, Brakerski, Gentry and Vaikuntanathan described a different framework where the ciphertext noise grows only linearly with the multiplicative level instead of exponentially [BGV12] , so that bootstrapping is no longer necessary to obtain a scheme supporting the homomorphic evaluation of any given polynomial size circuit. Currently three main families of fully homomorphic encryption schemes are known:
2. van Dijk, Gentry, Halevi and Vaikuntanathan's (DGHV) scheme over the integers [DGHV10] .
It was recently shown how to significantly reduce the public key size in DGHV, yielding a 10.3 MB public key and an 11-minute refresh procedure [CNT12] .
Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan's scheme based on the Learning with Errors (LWE) and Ring
Learning with Errors (RLWE) problems [BV11a, BV11b] , and follow-up works (e.g. the scale-free variant of Brakerski [Bra12] and the NTRU-variant [LATV12] ). An implementation is described in [GHS12b] with an efficient (given the current state of knowledge) homomorphic evaluation of the full AES encryption circuit. The authors use the batch RLWE-based scheme proposed in [BGV12, GHS12a] , that allows one to encrypt vectors of plaintexts in a single ciphertext and to perform any permutation on the underlying plaintext vector while manipulating only the ciphertext [SV11] .
Our Contributions. In this paper we focus on the DGHV scheme. Our goal is to extend DGHV to support the same batching capability [SV11] as in RLWE-based schemes [BV11a, BV11b] , and to homomorphically evaluate a full AES circuit with roughly the same level of efficiency as [GHS12b] , in order to obtain an implementation of a FHE scheme with similar features but based on different techniques and assumptions.
In the original DGHV scheme, a ciphertext has the form c = q · p + 2r + m where p is the secret key, q is a large random integer, and r is a small random integer (noise); the bit message m ∈ {0, 1} is recovered by computing m = [c mod p] 2 . The scheme is clearly homomorphic for both addition and multiplication, since addition and multiplication of ciphertexts correspond to addition and multiplication of plaintexts modulo 2. To encrypt multiple bits m i into a single ciphertext c, we use the Chinese Remainder Theorem with respect to a tuple of coprime integers p 0 , . . . , p −1 . The batch ciphertext has the form c = q · −1 i=0 p i + CRT p 0 ,...,p −1 (2r 0 + m 0 , . . . , 2r −1 + m −1 ), and correctly decrypts to the bit vector (m i ) given by m i = [c mod p i ] 2 for all 0 i < . 5 Modulo each of the p i 's the ciphertext c behaves as in the original DGHV scheme. Accordingly, the addition or multiplication of two ciphertexts yields a new ciphertext that decrypts to the componentwise sum or product mod 2 of the original plaintexts.
The main challenge, however, is to amend this construction so as to prove semantic security. In the original DGHV scheme, public-key encryption is performed by masking the message m with a random subset sum of the public key elements x j = q j · p + r j as c = m + 2r + 2 j∈S x j x 0 .
(
The semantic security is proved by applying the Leftover Hash Lemma on the subset sum, and using the random 2r in (1) to further randomize the ciphertext modulo p. Extending DGHV public-key encryption to the batch setting may at first seem straightforward: one can use a similar random subset sum technique in the batch variant by generating public key elements x j with a small residue modulo each of the p i 's instead of only modulo p. However, for the proof of semantic security to go through, the ciphertext c should then be independently randomized modulo each of the p i 's, which isn't easy to achieve without knowing the p i 's. Indeed, if we only use a single additive term 2r as in (1), then the same random term 2r = 2r mod p i is added modulo each of the p i , which breaks the security proof.
Our main contribution in this paper is to provide a "correct", provably semantically secure generalization of DGHV to the batch setting. This is done by replacing the term 2r in Equation (1) by another subset sum of public key elements which, taken modulo each of the p i 's, generate a lattice with special properties. Our security proof then applies the Leftover Hash Lemma modulo this lattice instead of only modulo q 0 . We describe the new batch DGHV scheme in Section 3 and its security proof in Section 3.3. We show that our batch DGHV scheme can encrypt =Õ(λ 2 ) bits in a single ciphertext; therefore the ciphertext expansion ratio becomesÕ(λ 3 ) instead ofÕ(λ 5 ) in the original scheme.
In addition to componentwise addition and multiplication, we also show how to perform any permutation on plaintext bits publicly. As opposed to [BGV12, GHS12a] , we cannot use an underlying algebraic structure to perform rotations over plaintext bits (clearly, the automorphisms of Z do not provide any useful action on ciphertexts). Instead we show how to perform arbitrary permutations on the plaintext vector during the ciphertext refresh operation at no additional cost (but with a slight increase of the public key size). Our Recrypt operation is done in parallel over the slots, with the same complexity as a single Recrypt operation in the original scheme.
Finally, we describe an implementation of our batch DGHV scheme, with concrete parameters. We use our batch DGHV scheme to homomorphically evaluate the full AES encryption circuit. For the "Large" parameters with 72 bits of security, our implementation homomorphically encrypts up to 531 AES ciphertexts in parallel in an amortized 12 minutes per AES ciphertext on a desktop computer. This is comparable to the timings presented by Gentry et al. at Crypto 2012 for their implementation of an RLWE-based scheme [GHS12b] . 6 While our batch variant of DGHV does not provide additional features nor significantly improved efficiency over the RLWE-based scheme of [GHS12a] , we believe it is interesting to obtain FHE schemes with similar properties but based on different techniques and assumptions.
The Somewhat Homomorphic DGHV Scheme
In this section, we recall the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme over the integers of van Dijk, Gentry, Halevi and Vaikuntanathan (DGHV) in [DGHV10] . Let λ be the security parameter, τ be the number of elements in the public key, γ their bit-length, η the bit-length of the secret key p and ρ (resp. ρ ) the bit-length of the noise in the public key (resp. in a fresh ciphertext).
For a real number x, we denote by x , x and x the upper, lower or nearest integer part of x. For integers z, p we denote the reduction of z modulo p by (z mod p) or [z] p with −p/2 < [z] p p/2. For a specific η-bit odd integer p, we use the following distribution over γ-bit integers:
Relabel the x i 's so that x 0 is the largest. Restart unless x 0 is odd and [x 0 ] p is even. Let pk = (x 0 , x 1 , . . . x τ ) and sk = p.
DGHV. Encrypt(pk, m ∈ {0, 1}). Choose a random subset S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , τ } and a random integer r in (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ), and output the ciphertext:
DGHV. Evaluate(pk, C, c 1 , . . . , c t ). Given the circuit C with t input bits and t ciphertexts c i , apply the addition and multiplication gates of C to the ciphertexts, performing all the additions and multiplications over the integers, and return the resulting integer.
As shown in [DGHV10] the scheme is somewhat homomorphic, i.e. a limited number of homomorphic operations can be performed on ciphertexts. More precisely given two ciphertexts c = q · p + 2r + m and c = q · p + 2r + m where r and r are ρ -bit integers, the ciphertext c + c is an encryption of m + m mod 2 under a (ρ + 1)-bit noise and the ciphertext c · c is an encryption of m · m with noise bit-length 2ρ . Since the ciphertext noise must remain smaller than p to maintain correctness, the scheme roughly allows η/ρ successive multiplications on ciphertexts.
The scheme is semantically secure under the Approximate-GCD assumption (see [DGHV10] ):
Definition 1 (Approximate GCD). The (ρ, η, γ)-Approximate-GCD problem consists, given a random η-bit odd integer p and given polynomially many samples from D γ,ρ (p), in outputting p.
Our Batch DGHV Scheme
We now describe our extension of the DGHV scheme to the batch setting. The goal is to pack plaintext bits m 0 , . . . , m −1 into a single ciphertext. Homomorphic addition and multiplication will then apply in parallel and component-wise on the m i 's.
As explained in the introduction we use Chinese Remaindering with respect to coprime integers p 0 , . . . , p −1 to encrypt (m 0 , . . . , m −1 ) as
By extending the original DGHV public-key encryption equation (2), a plaintext vector m = (m 0 , . . . , m −1 ) could then be encrypted into a single ciphertext:
where the plaintext elements x i satisfy x i mod p j = r i,j and the additional public key elements x i are such that x i mod p j = δ i,j + 2r i,j ; this yields [c mod p j ] 2 = m j as required. 7 The main challenge, however, is to obtain a batch DGHV scheme which is still semantically secure. The proof of semantic security for the original DGHV scheme is based on applying the Leftover Hash Lemma on the subset sum, and using the random 2r in (1) to further randomize the ciphertext modulo p. However we see that such randomization with 2r in (3) does not work in the batch setting, because the same random term 2r = 2r mod p i is added modulo each of the p i , whereas for the security proof to go through these random terms should be independently distributed modulo each of the p i 's. Therefore a new technique is required to extend DGHV to semantically secure batch encryption.
In the following, we start by describing a variant of DGHV still for a single bit message m only, but which does extend naturally to the batch setting. We first consider the DGHV scheme without the additional random 2r, since this term is of no use in the batch setting. A single message bit m is then encrypted as
We denote by δi,j the Kronecker delta, δi,j = 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise. where x i = q i · p + r i . In order to prove semantic security as in [DGHV10] , one should prove that the values q and r given by c = q · p + 2r + m are essentially random and independently distributed. The randomness of q = 2 i∈S q i mod q 0 follows from the Leftover Hash Lemma (LHL) modulo q 0 . However we cannot apply the LHL to r = i∈S r i because it is distributed over Z instead of modulo an integer. Note that in the original scheme the randomness of r followed from adding a random 2r in (1), much larger than the r i 's.
Let us assume that we could somehow reduce the integer variable r = i∈S r i modulo some integer . Then we could apply the LHL simultaneously modulo q 0 and modulo , and the distributions of q mod q 0 and r mod would be independently random as required. However, during public-key encryption we certainly do not have access to the variable r = i∈S r i , so we cannot a priori reduce it modulo an integer in the encryption phase. Our technique is the following: instead of reducing the variable r modulo , we add a large random multiple of to r . This can be done by extending the public key with a new element Π such that Π mod p = . Encryption would then be performed as
for some large random integer b. Modulo p this gives a new integer r = r + b · ; we argue that this enables to proceed as if r was actually reduced modulo . Namely, if we generate the r i 's such that the sum r = i∈S r i is not much larger than , then reducing r modulo would just subtract a small multiple of , which is negligible compared to the large random multiple b · . Formally the distribution of r + b · is statistically close to (r mod ) + b · , which enables us to apply the LHL to r mod and eventually obtain a security proof. Now the advantage of (4) is that it can be easily extended to the batch setting. Instead of using a single random multiple of Π, we use a subset sum of such multiples Π i , where Π i mod p j = i,j . The Leftover Hash Lemma is then applied modulo the lattice generated by the i,j . This shows that the random noise values modulo the p i 's follow essentially independent distributions, and eventually leads to a security proof.
Description
BDGHV. KeyGen(1 λ ). Generate a collection of random η-bit primes p 0 , . . . , p −1 , and denote π their product. Let us define the error-free public key element
is a 2 λ 2 -rough integer 8 . Generate the following integers x i , x i and Π i with a quotient by π uniformly and independently distributed in Z ∩ [0, q 0 ), and with the following distribution modulo p j for 0 j < :
BDGHV. Encrypt(pk, m ∈ {0, 1} ). Choose random integer vectors b = (b i ) 1 i τ ∈ (−2 α , 2 α ) τ and b = (b i ) 0 i −1 ∈ (−2 α , 2 α ) and output the ciphertext:
8 An integer a is b-rough when it does not contain prime factors smaller than b. 
Parameters and Correctness
The parameters must be set under the following constraints:
• ρ 2λ to avoid brute force attack on the noise [CN12],
• η α + ρ + 1 + log 2 ( ) for correct decryption,
• η ρ · Θ(λ log 2 λ) for homomorphically evaluating the "squashed decryption" circuit
• γ = ω(η 2 · log λ) in order to thwart lattice-based attacks (see [DGHV10, CMNT11] );
• ρ ρ + λ and α α + λ for the proof of semantic security (see below),
• α · τ γ + λ and τ · (ρ + 2) + λ in order to apply the leftover hash lemma (see below).
To satisfy the above constraints one can take ρ = 2λ, η =Õ(λ 2 ), γ =Õ(λ 5 ), α =Õ(λ 2 ), τ =Õ(λ 3 ) as in [CNT12] , and ρ = 3λ, α =Õ(λ 2 ) and =Õ(λ 2 ). The main difference with the original DGHV scheme is that the ciphertext expansion ratio becomes γ/ =Õ(λ 3 ) instead of γ =Õ(λ 5 ). However the public key size (using the compressed public key technique from [CNT12] ) becomesÕ(λ 7 ) instead ofÕ(λ 5 ). We refer to Section 4.4 for concrete parameters and timings.
We prove the following lemma in Appendix A. We refer to Appendix A for the definition of correctness for batch homomorphic encryption schemes, with respect to a set C E of permitted circuits.
Lemma 1. The above scheme is correct for C E .
Semantic Security
Ideally we would like to base the security of the new batch DGHV scheme on the same assumption as the original scheme, i.e. the Approximate-GCD assumption from Definition 1. However we can only show its security under the (stronger) error-free Approximate-GCD assumption already considered in [CMNT11, CNT12] . For two specific integers p and q 0 , we use the following distribution over γ-bit integers:
Definition 2 (Error-free approximate GCD). The (ρ, η, γ)-error-free Approximate-GCD problem is: For a random η-bit prime p, given y 0 = q 0 · p where q 0 is a random integer in [0, 2 γ /p), and polynomially many samples from D ρ (p, q 0 ), output p.
Theorem 1. The batch DGHV scheme is semantically secure under the error-free-approximate-GCD assumption.
Proof of Theorem 1
We proceed in two steps. First we prove that our batch DGHV scheme is semantically secure under a new assumption, which we call the error-free -decisional-approximate-GCD assumption. We then show that this new assumption is implied by the (computational) error-free Approximate-GCD assumption from the previous section. Given integers q 0 and p 0 , . . . , p −1 , we define the following oracle O q 0 ,(p i ) (v) which, given as input a vector v ∈ Z , outputs x with Definition 3 (EF--dAGCD λ,γ,η ). The error-free -decisional-approximate-GCD problem is as follows. Pick random η-bit integers p 0 , . . . , p −1 of product π, a random 2
The decisional problem is therefore to distinguish between an encryption of 0 and an encryption of a random message. To prove semantic security we must show that this still holds when using the public-key encryption procedure instead of the oracle O q 0 ,(p i ) ; this essentially amounts to applying a variant of the Leftover Hash Lemma.
Lemma 2. The batch DGHV scheme is semantically secure under the error-free -decisionalapproximate-GCD assumption.
Proof. Under the attack scenario the attacker first receives the public key, and outputs two -bit messages m 0 and m 1 . The challenger returns an encryption of m b for a random bit b. The attacker finally outputs a guess b and succeeds if b = b. We use a sequence of games and denote by S i the event that the attacker succeeds in Game i . Game 0 : this is the attack scenario. We simulate the challenger by running KeyGen to obtain pk and sk. Game 1 : we introduce a vector representation of ciphertexts. To any ciphertext c mod x 0 we associate the vector:
We observe that if a ciphertext c is an encryption of 0 then it is equivalently rewritten as c = (q c , 2c 0 , . . . , 2c −1 ) = I 2 · (q c , c 0 , . . . , c −1 ) where I 2 is the diagonal matrix with (1, 2, . . . , 2) on the diagonal. Given two integers x, y, we have that if |x mod p i | < p i /4 and |y mod p i | < p i /4 for all i, then f (x + y) = f (x) + f (y). Since we only consider ciphertexts which have sufficiently small residues modulo the p i 's, when adding ciphertexts we can therefore work indifferently with integer or our vector representation. In vector representation the encryption equation (5) can then be rewritten as 9 c = (0, m)
where the columns of matrices X , X and Π contain the vector representations (with the previous I 2 factor) of the ciphertexts x i (without the δ i,j terms), x i and Π i from the public key:
We now modify the encryption Equation (6) as follows. We pre-reduce the term X · m + X · b modulo the lattice Π formed by the column vectors of x 0 and Π:
Given a ciphertext c, we denote by c mod x0 the vector obtained by reducing the first component modulo q0.
which gives the new encryption equation:
We prove in Appendix B.3 that two distributions are statistically close, which gives:
Game 2 : we show in Appendix B.4 that using the LHL, the term X · b in Equation (7) is statistically close to uniform modulo Π . Therefore we can replace the term X · m + X · b by a random vector u modulo Π to get c = (0, m)
Game 3 : we keep the same encryption equation
but we slightly modify the distribution of u. Instead of generating a random u modulo Π , we generate a vector u whose first component is uniform in [0, q 0 ) and the other components are uniform in [0, 2 ρ ). We show in Appendix B.7:
Game 4 : instead of generating the public key with KeyGen, we simulate the public key using the oracle O q 0 ,(p i ) from the error-free -decisional Approximate-GCD problem. Moreover the encryption equation from Game 3 can be computed directly in integer representation instead of vector representation using O q 0 ,(p i ) . Therefore we can simulate the public key and ciphertext encryption without knowing the p i 's, and we still have:
Game 5 : to prepare for the -decisional problem, we slightly modify the encryption equation with
where z is a vector whose first component is uniform in [0, q 0 ) and the other components are uniform in (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ). From the distribution of z and u, we obtain:
Game 6 : we modify again the encryption equation by adding a vector
It is easy to see that the gap between Game 5 and Game 6 is at most the distinguishing advantage of an efficient adversary against the error-free -decisional-approximate-GCD problem. Namely the vector I 2 · z in Equation (9) can be obtained through z = O q 0 ,(p i ) (v 0 ) where v 0 = 0 , whereas the vector z 1 + I 2 · z can be obtained from z = O q 0 ,(p i ) (v 1 ) where v 1 ← {0, 1} . Therefore
Game 7 : we remove the term (0, m) T in (11). Then the adversary's view in Game 7 is independent from m and we get
The statistical distance between the random variables (0, m) T + z 1 + I 2 · z and z 1 + I 2 · z is at most · 2 −ρ . Therefore:
Finally all the previous probability gaps can be made negligible by satisfying the constraints on the parameters from Section 3.2; this concludes the proof of Lemma 2.
We then prove the following Lemma in Appendix C. Combined with Lemma 2 this proves Theorem 1.
Lemma 3. The -decisional-Approximate-GCD problem is hard if the error-free-approximate-GCD problem is hard.
Making the Scheme Fully Homomorphic
In this section, we follow Gentry's blueprint [Gen09] to transform a somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme into a fully homomorphic encryption scheme.
The Squashed Scheme
As mentioned in the introduction, to follow Gentry's blueprint and make our somewhat homomorphic scheme amenable to bootstrapping, we first need to squash the decryption circuit, i.e. change the decryption procedure so as to express it as a low degree polynomial in the bits of the secret key.
We use the same technique as in the original DGHV scheme [DGHV10] but generalize it to the batch setting. We add to the public key a set y = {y 0 , . . . , y Θ−1 } of rational numbers in [0, 2) with κ bits of precision after the binary point, such that for all 0 j − 1 there exists a sparse subset S j ⊂ [0, Θ − 1] of size θ with i∈S j y i 1/p j mod 2. The secret-key is replaced by the indicator vector of the subsets S j . Formally the scheme is modified as follows:
BDGHV. KeyGen(1 λ ). Generate sk * = (p 0 , . . . , p −1 ) and pk * as before. Set x p j ← 2 κ /p j for j = 0, . . . , − 1. Choose at random Θ-bit vectors s j = (s j,0 , . . . , s j,Θ−1 ), each of Hamming weight θ, for 0 j < . Choose at random Θ integers u i ∈ [0, 2 κ+1 ) for 0 i < Θ, fulfilling the condition that x p j = Θ−1 i=0 s j,i · u i mod 2 κ+1 for all j. Set y i = u i /2 κ and y = (y 0 , . . . , y Θ−1 ). Hence, each y i is a positive number smaller than two, with κ bits of precision after the binary point, and verifies
for some |ε j | < 2 −κ . Output the secret key sk = (s 0 , . . . , s −1 ) and public key pk = (pk * , y 0 , . . . , y Θ−1 ).
BDGHV. Expand(pk, c).
The ciphertext expansion procedure takes as input a ciphertext c and computes an expanded ciphertext: for every 0 i Θ−1, compute z i given by z i = c·y i mod 2 with n = log 2 (θ +1) bits of precision after the binary point. Define the vector z = (z i ) i=0,...,Θ−1 and output the expanded ciphertext (c, z).
BDGHV. Decrypt(sk, c, z). Output m = (m 0 , . . . , m −1 ) with
This completes the description of the scheme. We use n = log 2 (θ + 1) as in [CMNT11] ; the proof of the following Lemma is the same as in [CMNT11, Appendix E].
Lemma 4. The BDGHV encryption scheme is correct for the set C(P E ) of circuits that compute permitted polynomials.
Remark 1. To reduce the size of the public key we can generate all the y i 's pseudo-randomly as in [CMNT11] , except of them in order to satisfy Equation (12) for all 0 j < .
Bootstrapping
As in [DGHV10] , we get that the BDGHV scheme is bootstrappable. Moreover, the Recrypt procedures works naturally in parallel over the plaintext bits.
In the original DGHV scheme, the decryption equation was:
and could be homomorphically evaluated by providing an encryption σ i of every secret-key bit s i ; one would obtain a new ciphertext which would encrypt the same plaintext bit m but with a possibly reduced noise. Similarly, the decryption Equation (13) for the batch scheme can be evaluated homomorphically by providing for all 0 i < Θ an encryption σ i of the secret-key bits s j,i , with:
This gives a new ciphertext that encrypts the same -bit plaintext vector, but with a (possibly) reduced noise. In other words, instead of having an homomorphic evaluation of a single Equation (14), we have that the equations in (13) are homomorphically evaluated in parallel, one in each of the plaintext slots of the ciphertext. Therefore the Recrypt operation is done in parallel over the slots, with the same complexity as a single Recrypt operation in the original scheme. From Gentry's theorem, we obtain a homomorphic encryption scheme for circuits of any depth. The proof of the following theorem is identical to the proof of Theorem 5.1 in [CMNT11] .
Theorem 2. Let E be the above scheme, and let D E be the set of augmented (squashed) decryption circuits. Then D E ⊂ C(P E ).
Complete Set of Operations for Plaintext Vectors
From what precedes, we can implement homomorphic SIMD-type operations on our packed ciphertexts, where the Add and Mult operations are applied to different input bits at once. However, a desired feature when dealing with packed ciphertexts is the ability to move values between plaintext slots with a public Permute operation. As opposed to [GHS12a] we cannot rely on an underlying algebraic structure. Instead we show how to perform such Permute at ciphertext refresh time. This feature is therefore supported at no extra cost assuming a ciphertext refresh operation has to be carried out anyway (i.e. after each Mult gate). Notice that a similar technique was described independently in [BGH12] for the RLWE-based fully homomorphic schemes [BV11a, BV11b, GHS12a] .
For any permutation ζ over {0, . . . , − 1}, we want to homomorphically evaluate the function -Permute (ζ, (u 0 , . . . , u −1 )) = u ζ(0) , . . . , u ζ( −1) .
Let ζ be a permutation to be applied homomorphically on the plaintext bits. During the KeyGen Therefore any permutation ζ can be implemented by putting the corresponding σ ζ i 's in the public key.
To be able to perform arbitrary permutations on the plaintext vector, one can augment the public key by a minimal set of permutations ζ's that generates the whole permutation group S , such as the transposition (1, 2) and the cycle (1, 2, . . . , ). In that case the impact on the public key is small (as only 2 · Θ · γ bits are added), but the performance overhead is significant, since as many as O( ) ciphertext refresh operations may be needed to carry out a desired permutation.
A more practical solution is to use a Beneš network [Ben64] of permutations as in [GHS12a] . In that case it suffices to add 2 log 2 ( ) permuting elements to the public key to enable circular rotations by ±2 i bit position. Then any permutation can be obtained in (2 log( ) − GHS12a] . This approach has a limited impact on the public key (2 log 2 ( ) · Θ · γ more bits), and any permutation can then be performed with at most 6 · (2 log 2 − 1) recryptions.
In practice, however, the circuit to be homomorphically evaluated is likely to be known in advance, so it is possible to put a set of distinguished permutations in the public key that provides an optimal time-memory tradeoff. In the next section, we describe two variants of homomorphic evaluations of the full AES circuit that require respectively only four permutations and no permutation at all.
Implementation Results
We provide in Table 1 concrete key sizes and timings for our batch DGHV scheme, based on a C++ implementation using the GMP library. We use essentially the same parameters as in [CNT12, CT12] ; in particular, the parameters take into account the attack from [CN12] . We use the same compressed public-key variant as in [CNT12] . We provide a complete description of the scheme in Appendix D. As in [CMNT11,CNT12], we take n = 4 and θ = 15 for all security levels.
We obtain essentially the same running times as in [CNT12] . The main difference is that the Recrypt operation is now performed in parallel over = 531 bits (for the "Large" setting) instead of a single bit. Table 1 . Benchmarking for our Batch DGHV with a compressed public key on a desktop computer (Intel Core i7 at 3.4Ghz, 32GB RAM).
Homomorphic Evaluation of the AES Circuit
In this section, we show how to homomorphically evaluate the AES-128 encryption circuit using our batch encryption scheme, and provide concrete timings. A similar implementation with the RLWEbased fully-homomorphic encryption scheme [BV11a,BV11b,GHS12a] is described in [GHS12b] .
As mentioned in [SV11, NLV11, GHS12b] , such an implementation can be used to optimize the communication cost in cloud-based applications. Indeed, since the ciphertext expansion ratio in most fully-homomorphic encryption schemes is huge, data can rather be send encrypted under AES with a ciphertext expansion equal to 1, along with the public key pk FHE of the FHE scheme scheme as well as the AES secret-key encrypted under pk FHE . Then, before the cloud performs homomorphic operations on the data, it can first run the AES decryption algorithm homomorphically to obtain the plaintext data encrypted under pk FHE . 10 We consider our BDGHV scheme with slots. We describe two variants of our implementation which we call byte-wise bitslicing and state-wise bitslicing .
Byte-Wise Bitslicing. In this representation, the 16-byte AES state is viewed as a matrix of 16 rows of 8 bits each (one row for every byte). Each of the 8 columns is then stored on a different ciphertext. Therefore an AES state requires 16 slots of 8 ciphertexts, and one can perform k = /16 AES encryptions in parallel using these 8 ciphertexts. Formally the AES state is composed of 8 ciphertexts c 0 , . . . , c 7 , where the underlying plaintexts m 0 , . . . , m 7 are such that m i [k · 16 + j] is the i-th bit of the j-th element of the AES state of the k-th AES. 11 We briefly describe how to implement the AES stages; more details are provided in Appendix E.
The AddRoundKey stage performs a XOR between the AES state and the current round key. This operation only consists of 8 BDGHV. Add operations. The SubBytes stage is implemented using the 115 gates circuit of Boyar and Peralta [BP10] to compute the Sbox. To minimize the number of Recrypt, we perform the Recrypt operation only on 9 of the temporary variables and on the 8 outputs. In total, this stage costs 83 Add, 32 Mult and 17 Recrypt.
The ShiftRows stage consists in performing a permutation of the state. For this we add the σ ζ i 's of the associated permutation ζ in the public key, and the rotation is performed at no additional cost during the final Recrypt of the SubBytes stages. Finally the MixColumns stage requires 3 permutations of the AES state; it requires a total of 3 × 8 = 24 Recrypt and 38 Add, and the addition of the σ ζ i 's of three permutations ζ to the public key. In total, our byte-wise implementation of AES requires 1260 BDGHV. Add, 320 BDGHV. Mult, and 377 BDGHV. Recrypt. The AddRoundKey stage requires 128 Add operations. The SubBytes stage is implemented using the same circuit as above. Since the circuit needs to be evaluated on each of the 16 bytes of the AES state, the stage costs 16 × 83 = 1328 Add, 16 × 32 = 512 Mult, and 16 × 17 = 272 Recrypt. The ShiftRows stage consists in performing a permutation of the state, and this is done by permuting the indices of bits in the homomorphic AES state at no additional cost. The MixColumns stage requires 608 Add. The total cost the AES evaluation is then 14688 BDGHV. Add, 5120 BDGHV. Mult and 2448 BDGHV. Recrypt. More details are provided in Appendix E. Implementation Results. We implemented both variants using the concrete parameters from Table 1 ; our results are summarized in Table 2 . The relative time is the total time of AES evaluation divided by the number of encryptions processed in parallel. Notice that the state-wise bitslicing variant yields better relative times.
Our timings are comparable to [GHS12b] for the RLWE-based scheme, where a relative time of 5 minutes per block is reported; the authors used a 24-core server with 256GB of RAM, while our program runs on a more modest desktop computer with 4 cores and 32GB of RAM (the whole public key fits in RAM). We claim a slightly lower security level, however: 72 bits versus 80 bits for the implementation from [GHS12b] . 
A Correctness of the Scheme
We recall and adapt to the batch settings the definition of correctness from [Gen09, DGHV10] . We consider an homomorphic public-key encryption scheme E with an additional algorithm Evaluate taking as input the public key pk, a mod-2 arithmetic circuit C with t inputs and t ciphertexts c i , and outputting another ciphertext c.
Definition 4 (Correct batch homomorphic decryption).
The scheme
is correct for a given t-input circuit C if, for any key-pair (sk, pk) output by KeyGen(λ), any t plaintext -bit vectors m 1 , . . . , m t , and any ciphertexts C = (c 1 , . . . , c t ) with c i ← Encrypt(pk, m i ), it holds that
As in [Gen09,DGHV10], we define a permitted circuit as one where for any i 1 and any set of integers inputs less that i 2 i(α +ρ +2) in absolute value, the generalized circuit's output has absolute value at most 2 i(η−3−n) with n = log 2 (λ + 1) ; we let C E be the set of permitted circuits.
We show that the batch scheme presented in Section 3 is correct.
Proof (of Lemma 1). Given a ciphertext c outputted by BDGHV. Encrypt(pk, m), there exist integer
For each j = 0, . . . , − 1, this gives
Let C be a permitted circuit with t inputs and let C † be the corresponding circuit operations over the integers rather than modulo 2. Let c i ← BDGHV. Encrypt(pk, m i ). We have, for each j = 0, . . . , − 1,
From (15) and the definition of permitted circuits, we obtain
which implies from (16) that c mod p j = C † (c 1 mod p j , . . . , c t mod p j ), and eventually
which concludes the proof.
B Proof of Lemma 2
In Sections B.1 and B.2, we establish some preliminary results.
B.1 Cardinality of the Kernel of a Linear Map
Lemma 5. Let G be a finite abelian group of order |G|. Let t 1 be an integer. For any a = (a 1 , . . . , a t ) ∈ Z t , define the linear map φ a : G t → G by φ a (g 1 , . . . , g t ) = Proof. We prove this result componentwise. Let a ∈ Z t . For any index j ∈ [1, r], consider the map
Its image is the subgroup of Z/d j Z generated by gcd(a 1 , . . . , a t ), hence
The result follows directly.
B.2 Diagonally Dominant Matrices
Given a matrix B = (b ij ) ∈ Z n×n , we let Λ i (B) = k =i |b ik |.
Definition 5 (Diagonally dominant matrix).
We first show that a diagonally dominant matrix is invertible and give a bound on the operator norm of its inverse.
Lemma 6. Let B = (b ij ) ∈ Z n×n be a diagonally dominant matrix. Then B is invertible and
where · ∞ is the operator norm on n × n matrices with respect to the ∞ norm on R n .
Proof. For any vector t ∈ R n , we have
There exists k such that t ∞ = |t k |. Consequently
, where ε > 0 since B is a diagonally dominant matrix. This implies that the matrix B is invertible, since Bt = 0 ⇒ Bt ∞ = 0 ⇒ t ∞ = 0 ⇒ t = 0. Given u ∈ R n , let t = B −1 u. Then from Equation (17) with Bt = u
Lemma 7. Let B = (b ij ) ∈ Z n×n be a diagonally dominant matrix, with b ii > 0 for all i. Let U be the set of vectors (u i ) ∈ Z n such that |u i | < ∆ i /2 where
Proof. Let u, u be two distinct vectors in U . We have |u i − u i | < b ii − Λ i (B) for all i. Let v be a non-zero vector in the lattice generated by the column vectors of B; we show that
for some i. Therefore we must have u = u mod B.
We write v = B · y for some non-zero vector y ∈ Z n . Let M = max{|y k |; 1 k n} and let i such that |y i | = M . We write:
which gives:
which gives using M 1:
B.3 Proof of Claim 1
Given an invertible matrix A ∈ Z n×n and a vector y ∈ Z n , we denote by x = y mod A the vector
Since the first component of c is always reduced modulo q 0 , we can restrict ourselves to the last components of the vectors, and to the sub-matrix
More precisely, letting u := X · m + X · b, we have
where u ∈ Z is the vector u with its first component removed. This gives
We have
Moreover since Π is a diagonally-dominant matrix, we have from Lemma 6 in Appendix B.2
Since the vector b has its components uniformly distributed in (−2 α , 2 α ), for any fixed vector Π −1 · u the statistical distance between b and b − Π −1 · u is at most · τ · 2 α+2−α ; this gives the same upper-bound for the statistical distance between the ciphertext c in Game 0 and Game 1 , which proves the claim.
B.4 Proof of Claim 2
Our goal is to show that the distribution of the term X · b mod Π is statistically close to the uniform distribution modulo Π . First, we show that the distribution of X mod Π is statistically close to the uniform distribution of matrices with τ columns in Y = Z +1 /(Π ).
Lemma 8. The distribution of X is ε-statistically close to uniform over Y τ , where
Therefore instead of considering the distribution of X ·b mod Π we can consider the distribution of G·b mod Π where G is uniformly distributed over the matrices with τ columns in Y = Z +1 /(Π ). For this we consider the family H of hash functions h G : X → Y where X = (−2 α , 2 α ) τ and
where G is a matrix of τ columns vectors over Y = Z +1 /(Π ). Using the Leftover Hash Lemma, we show:
Lemma 9. The distribution of (G, G · b mod Π ) is ε 2 -statistically close to uniform modulo Π , with
Combining Lemma 8 and Lemma 9 this proves Claim 2.
B.5 Proof of Lemma 8
We must show that the distribution of the vectors x i 's is statistically close to uniform modulo Π . For this it suffices to show that the distribution of the vectors r i = (r i,0 , . . . , r i, −1 ) ∈ Z is statistically close to uniform modulo Π , where
Namely the first coefficient of the x i 's is uniform modulo q 0 and independent of the other coefficients, therefore it is distributed as the first coefficient of a random vector modulo Π . The vectors r i = (r i,0 , . . . , r i, −1 ) ∈ Z are uniformly and independently distributed in the set
We must show that when r ← U 0 the distribution of r mod Π is statistically close to uniform in Z /(Π ). We consider the following subset of U 0 :
where
. From Lemma 7 we have that the vectors of U 0 are all distinct modulo Π . Therefore when r ← U 0 (instead of U 0 ) then r mod Π is uniformly distributed in the set:
To prove Lemma 8 it suffices to show that the sets U 0 and U 0 have very close size, and that the sets U 1 and Z /(Π ) have very close size. We know that |U 0 | |U 0 | 2 ρ · and that |U 0 | = |U 1 | |Z /(Π )| = |det Π |; therefore it suffices to obtain a lower-bound for |U 0 | and an upper-bound for |det Π |.
To obtain a lower-bound for |U 0 | we write:
To upper bound |det Π | we use Hadamard's inequality
where π j is the j-th row of Π . We have for all j:
Combining the previous inequality with (18), we obtain:
Combining inequalities (18) and (19) we obtain that the statistical distance between r mod Π with r ← U 0 and the uniform distribution in Z /(Π ) is at most 2 · 2 ρ−ρ +2 , which proves Lemma 8.
B.6 Proof of Lemma 9
We consider the family H of hash functions h G : X → Y where
where G is a matrix of τ columns vectors over Y = Z +1 /(Π ). We must show that (h G , h G (b)) is uniformly distributed in H × Y when h ← H and b ← X. We first recall the notion of ε-pairwise independence introduced in [CMNT11] .
The following generalization of the usual leftover hash lemma is proved in [CMNT11] .
Lemma 10 (Leftover hash lemma). Let H be a family of ε-pairwise independent hash functions. Suppose that h ← H and x ← X are chosen uniformly and independently. Then (h, h(x)) is (
Therefore to apply Lemma 10 we show that the hash function family h G (b) = G · b mod Π is ε-pairwise independent. We must bound the value δ defined by:
Let b, b ∈ X, b = b and define a = b − b . We denote by (q i , r i ) ∈ Z +1 the column vectors of G, for 1 i τ . We have that
Therefore for any fixed
We have that gcd(a 1 , . . . , a τ , q 0 ) = 1. Indeed, all the factors of q 0 are such that 2 λ 2 > 2 α+1 > a j for all j, and thus any nonzero a j is coprime with q 0 . Consequently, applying Lemma 5 to G = Z q 0 , we get |ker φ a,q 0 |
We now consider the group G = Z /(Π ) and define the set
where d r is the larger invariant factor of G, i.e. is such that G
We denote by U the complement of U . From Lemma 5 we have that ker φ a,Π = |det(Π )| τ −1 when a ∈ U . Therefore,
Therefore it suffices to bound the number of (b, b ) such that b − b ∈ U . For any b ∈ X, define
We write d r = β 1 · · · β m with β j prime for j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, where the β j 's are not supposed distinct. Thus b ∈ U b if and only if there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , m} such that b i − b i ∈ β j Z for all i = 1, . . . , τ . Now, since we have |(β j Z ∩ (−2 α , 2 α ))| 2 α+1 /β j and β j 2, as well as d r |det(Π )| < 2 ·(ρ +1) which implies m · (ρ + 1), we obtain:
This gives
This shows that the hash function family H is ε-pairwise independent, with ε := · ρ · 2 ·(ρ +2)−τ . Finally, applying Lemma 10 we obtain that the distribution of (h, h(b)) for h ← H, b ← (−2 α , 2 α ) τ is ε 2 -uniform over H × Y , where:
which proves Lemma 9.
B.7 Proof of Claim 3
We must show that that the distribution
is statistically close to the distribution:
We consider the intermediate distribution:
Applying the same technique as in the proof of Claim 1, the statistical distance between D 2 and D 2 is at most · 2 3−α . Moreover applying the same technique as in the proof of Lemma 8 the statistical distance between D 1 and D 2 is at most 2 · 2 ρ−ρ +2 . Summing the two statistical distances proves Claim 3.
C Proof of Lemma 3
We first prove the following lemma.
Lemma 11. The -decisional-Approximate-GCD problem is hard if the 1-decisional-Approximate-GCD problem is hard.
Proof. Given an algorithm A for solving the -decisional-Approximate-GCD problem, we construct an algorithm A 1 for solving the 1-decisional-Approximate-GCD problem. Our proof is based on generating − 1 of the primes p i 's ourselves and putting the prime p from the 1-decisional instance at a random position among the p i 's; we then show how to simulate the oracle for the -decisional instance using the oracle from the 1-decisional instance; eventually the challenge for the -decisional instance is simulated from the 1-decisional challenge using an hybrid argument. We receive as input an integer y 0 = p · q 0 where p is a random η-bit integer and q 0 ← [0, 2 γ /p) is 2 λ 2 -rough. We select a random integer i 0 ∈ [0, − 1] and we generate − 1 random η-bit primes p i for i ∈ [0, − 1] \ {i 0 }. We implicitly let p i 0 = p, where p is unknown. We let:
and we send x 0 to A .
Our simulation of the -oracle from the 1-oracle works as follows: given an integer y such that y = 2r + v mod p we can obtain by CRT an integer z such that z = 2r + v mod p and z = 2r i + v i mod p i for all i = i 0 , without knowing p but using y 0 = q 0 · p. Formally we have the following equality: Then we generate random r i ∈ Z ∩ (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ) for all i = i 0 and return the following value:
From equality (20), we have:
which shows that our simulation of the oracle O q 0 ,(p i ) is perfect. It remains to show how we generate the challenge z for the -instance. We receive as input a challenge y = CRT q 0 ,p (q, 2r + v b ) from the 1-instance, where b ← {0, 1}, v 0 = 0 and v 1 ← {0, 1}, and we must output a guess b of b. From y we construct a hybrid challenge z as previously
where v i = 0 for all 0 i < i 0 and v i ← {0, 1} for all i 0 < i − 1. Therefore z is an hybrid challenge containing the following bits w i :
where:
We send z to the A algorithm; eventually we output the bit b returned by A . To analyze the success probability of our algorithm A 1 we use the following hybrid argument. We note that the distribution of z for i 0 = j and b = 0 is the same as the distribution of z for i 0 = j + 1 and b = 1, for all 0 j < − 1. Moreover i 0 = 0 and b = 1 corresponds to the -oracle being called with v ← {0, 1} , while i 0 = − 1 and b = 0 corresponds to v = 0. Since i 0 is generated at random in [0, − 1] the distinguishing probability of our algorithm A 1 is given by:
where ε is the distinguishing probability of A on the -instance. Therefore the advantage of our algorithm A 1 is non-neglible if the advantage of A is non-neligible. This terminates the proof of Lemma 11.
It remains to show the following lemma.
Lemma 12. The 1-decisional-Approximate-GCD problem is hard if the error-free Approximate-GCD problem is hard.
Proof (sketch). The proof is essentially the same as the proof of semantic security of the original DGHV scheme in [DGHV10] . Namely from an algorithm A 1 solving the 1-decisional-Approximate-GCD problem one can build a similar "high-accuracy LSB predictor" for given z computing [z mod p] 2 . Then such "high-accuracy LSB predictor" is used to obtain a Binary GCD algorithm for integers of the form z = q · p + r for small r, which eventually enables to recover p.
D Complete Description of the Batch DGHV Scheme with Compressed Public Keys
In this section, we provide a complete description of our batch FHE scheme with the ciphertext compression technique of [CNT12] . Note that as in [CNT12] , the ciphertext compression technique is applied to both the public key elements x i 's, x i 's and Π i 's of the somewhat homomorphic scheme, and to the encryption σ i 's of the secret key bits. The ciphertext compression technique enables to compress a ciphertext from γ =Õ(λ 5 ) bits down to · η + λ = ·Õ(λ 2 ) bits.
D.1 Description
BDGHV. KeyGen(1 λ ). Generate a collection of primes p 0 , . . . , p −1 of size η bits, and denote π their product. Define the error-free public key element
Initialize a pseudo-random generator f 1 with a random seed se 1 . Use f 1 (se 1 ) to generate a set of
. Define γ-bit integers as follows:
where r i,j ← Z ∩ (−2 ρ −1 , 2 ρ −1 ) and
where r i,j ← Z ∩ (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ) and
where i,j ← Z ∩ (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ) and ξ Π i ← Z ∩ [0, 2 λ+log 2 ( )+ ·η /π). Additionally, generate at random Θ-bit vectors s j = (s j,0 , . . . , s j,Θ−1 ) for 0 j < , each split in θ boxes of size B = Θ/θ each, with exactly one non-zero bit in each box, and such that s j,j = 1 for each j = 0, . . . , − 1. Initialize a pseudo-random generator f 2 with a random seed se 2 , and use f 2 (se 2 ) to generate integers u i ∈ [0, 2 κ+1 ) for i ∈ Z ∩ [0, Θ − 1]. Then set u 0 , . . . , u −1 such that
where x p j = 2 κ /p j for each j = 0, . . . , − 1. Initialize a pseudo-random generator f 3 with a random seed se 3 . Use f 3 (se 3 ) to generate a set of integers
where r i,j ← Z ∩ (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ) and ξ σ i ← Z ∩ [0, 2 λ+log 2 ( )+ ·η /π). Output the secret key sk = (s 0 , . . . , s −1 ) and the public key
BDGHV. Encrypt(pk, m ∈ {0, 1} ). Use f 1 (se 1 ) to recover the integers χ i 's, χ i 's, and χ Π i 's. Let
BDGHV. Expand(pk, c). The ciphertext expand procedure takes a ciphertext c and compute the associated expanded ciphertext. To do so, use f 2 (s 2 ) to recover u , . . . , u Θ−1 , then let y i = u i /2 κ and compute z i given by
with n bits of precision after the binary point. Define the vector z = (z i ) i=0,...,Θ−1 and output the expanded ciphertext (c, z).
BDGHV. Recrypt(pk, c, z). Apply the decryption circuit to the expanded ciphertext z, and the encrypted secret key bits σ i . Output the result as a refreshed ciphertext c new .
D.2 Semantic Security
We prove the semantic security of the previous scheme. Note that the random oracle model is only necessary when using compressed public keys as in [CNT12] ; the semantic security of our batch FHE scheme from Section 3 does not require random oracles.
Theorem 3. The previous encryption scheme is semantically secure under the EF--dec-AGCD assumption, in the random oracle model.
Proof (sketch). The proof is almost the same as in Section 3.3. Following the same strategy as in [CNT12] , the random oracle can be programmed so that the distribution of the public key is statistically close to that of the batch scheme without compressed public keys.
E Description of our Homomorphic AES Implementations
In this section we describe two implementations of homomorphic evaluation of an AES circuit (HAES), using our BDGHV scheme with plaintext bits embedded in each ciphertext.
E.1 Byte-Wise Bitslicing
Throughout this subsection, we denote k = /16 the number of AES-128 encryptions one will be able to perform in parallel. We define a representation called byte-wise bitslicing in which the HAES state will be composed of 8 ciphertexts, each ciphertext containing one and exactly one bit of each byte of the AES state. This construction is similar to general-purpose bitslicing [Bih97, KS09] .
State. We recall that the AES state is a matrix of 4 × 4 bytes. It can be viewed as a 16-byte vector when reading the bytes by column. The state in our representation is composed of 8 ciphertexts c 0 , . . . , c 7 , where the underlying plaintexts m 0 , . . . , m 7 are such that m i [k · 16 + j] is the i-th bit of the j-th element of the state of the k-th AES (see Figure 1) . Thus m 0 represents the LSBs of the bytes of the AES states for the k AES-plaintexts, and m 7 the MSBs. . . .
. . .
. . . AddRoundKey. From the 128-bit AES key, an expanded key is created with (10 + 1) rounds subkeys (namely, one subkey at the beginning of the encryption, and one per round). Each round subkey is XORed at one point with the AES state. Thus, each bit of the subkey is XORed with the corresponding bit of the state.
In this variant, we construct the round subkeys with the same structure as the HAES state (i.e. 8 ciphertexts); notice that we repeat each bit of the round subkey k times. Therefore, the AddRoundKey stage only consists in adding the corresponding ciphertexts with BDGHV. Add as the underlying operation is a XOR on the plaintext bits. This operation consists of 8 BDGHV. Add operations. Notice that the multiplication by M is viewed over GF(2) 8 GF(2 8 ), viewing b as its bitrepresentation vector.
A possible way to implement this stage could be to implement the multiplication of two FHE ciphertexts so that each byte of the underlying state is multiplied over GF(2 8 ) by the corresponding bit. Each multiplication would consumes one level of noise, i.e. after each multiplication 8 recryptions would be needed to recover a state with a "small" noise (i.e. small enough so that the eight ciphertexts can be multiplied once without prior recryption). The minimal solution to compute b 254 from b costs 4 multiplications and several squarings [RP10] (but here the squarings can be obtained easily with several BDGHV. Add only), giving a final cost of 32 BDGHV. Recrypt. However, as seen in Section 4.4, the cost of a recryption is really huge compared to the other operations.
To limit the number of recryptions, we used the 115 gates circuit of Boyar and Peralta [BP10] to compute the Sbox. In this circuit, we also have 32 multiplications, thus one could think that 32 recryptions are necessary. However, we can reduce the number of recryptions to 17 by a careful management of the noise. Recryptions are then performed on temporary variables t 21 , t 22 , t 23 , t 24 , t 26 , t 29 , t 33 , t 36 , t 40 and on the eight outputs; this enables to transform an homomorphic AES state with "small" noise into an homomorphic AES state with "small" noise after the SubBytes operation. If one does not care about the output noises, only 9 recryptions are performed. Therefore, this stage costs 32 BDGHV. Mult, 17 BDGHV. Recrypt and 83 BDGHV. Add. Note that under our representation the SBOX circuit is evaluated in parallel over the 16 bytes of an AES state, and also on the k AES blocks.
ShiftRows. The ShiftRows stage consists in performing the permutation ζ SR on the bytes of the AES state, where the Cauchy's two-line notation of the permutation is ζ SR = 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 0 13 10 7 4 1 14 11 8 5 2 15 12 9 6 3 .
Since we "sliced" the bytes of the AES state in our representation, we will need to apply a similar permutation on each ciphertext of the state. Since we are performing k AES blocks in parallel, we need to consider the permutation ζ defined by ζ(I × k + K) = ζ SR (I) × k + K, 0 K k − 1, 0 I 15.
Next, we need to permute each of the c i 's of the HAES state by ζ to perform the ShiftRows stage. As mentioned in Section 4.3, rotating the slots is "for free" when performed during a recryption. Now, we perform a recryption on each element of the HAES state at the end of the SubBytes stage. Thus, instead of using the regular σ i 's, we use the σ ζ i 's and the ShiftRows stage will be obtained at the end of the SubBytes stage at no additional cost.
Final Cost. The AES encryption process consists of 11 AddRoundKey stages, 10 SubBytes and ShiftRows stages and 9 MixColumns stages. Therefore, the final cost is 1260 BDGHV. Add, 386 BDGHV. Recrypt and 320 BDGHV. Mult. However, a fine management of the noise allows us to reduce the number of BDGHV. Recrypt to 377.
E.2 State-Wise Bitslicing
Throughout this subsection, we will be able to perform AES-128 encryptions in parallel. We define a representation called state-wise bitslicing in which the HAES state will be composed of 128 ciphertexts, each ciphertext containing one and exactly one bit of the AES state.
State. The state in our representation is composed of 128 ciphertexts c 0 , . . . , c 127 , where the underlying plaintexts m 0 , . . . , m 127 are such that m i+j·8 [k] is the i-th bit of the j-th element of the state of the k-th AES. In other words, the 128 bits of the State are represented in 128 different ciphertexts, and since slots are available, one can put different AES states in the 128 ciphertexts.
AddRoundKey. The AddRoundKey stage simply consists of BDGHV. Add operations, one per ciphertext in the state. Therefore, this stage costs 128 BDGHV. Add.
SubBytes.
As above, we use the Boyar and Peralda circuit [BP10] to perform this operation. However, our representation is less adapted to this stage than previously, since even though we process the k AES blocks in parallel, we need to apply this SubBytes stage on each group of 8 ciphertexts corresponding to one of the 16 bytes of the AES state. Therefore, we need to apply the same circuit 16 times with different inputs. Therefore, this stage costs 16 × 83 = 1328 BDGHV. Add, 16 × 17 = 272 BDGHV. Recrypt and 16 × 32 = 512 BDGHV. Mult.
ShiftRows. The permutation of the ShiftRows stage is no longer applied on the plaintext bits in each ciphertext of the State, but on the indices of the ciphertext of the HAES state. This stage is a relabelling of the indices of the ciphertexts of the HAES state. Therefore, this operation does not cost any homomorphic operation.
MixColumns. As above, the new HAES state can be written as a sum of four (possibly rotated or multiplied) states. But as in the ShiftRows stage, the permutations are no longer applied on the ciphertexts to rotate the plaintext bits, but on the indices of the ciphertexts of the HAES state. Therefore, copying and permuting the states is essentially free. However, we still need to multiply by 0x02 and 0x03 the current HAES state and its first permuted copy respectively. Algorithms 1 and 2 are still valid, and allows us to perform such multiplications in (3 + 11) × 16 = 224 BDGHV. Add. Finally, we need to add the 4 × 128 ciphertexts, and this costs 3 × 128 = 384 BDGHV. Add.
Final Cost. The AES encryption process consists of 11 AddRoundKey stages and 10 SubBytes. Therefore, the final cost is 14688 BDGHV. Add, 2720 BDGHV. Recrypt and 5120 BDGHV. Mult. However, a fine management of the noise allows us to reduce the number of BDGHV. Recrypt to 2448 (namely, we do not need to bootstrap at all in SubBytes during the first round).
Even though this representation seems far more costly in number of homomorphic operations, notice that in the state-wise bitslicing representation, we can process 16 times more AES plaintexts in parallel than in the byte-wise bitslicing representation. Therefore, for the same number of AES plaintexts, we save 60% of BDGHV. Recrypt, which gives better relatives times.
